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THE CARD WARRANTY AND CONSUMER SALES
The recent increase in legislative and professional interest in con-
sumer protection has not lacked a corresponding increase in articles by
educators, lawyers and student commentators.' The field of warranty
liability, especially in the wake of decisions such as Henningson v.
Bloomfield Motors, Incorporated2 and the cases that followed,' has been
thoroughly analyzed. Yet, there remains an aspect of warranty law which
has been largely ignored, but with which the general consumer4 has his
most frequent and direct contact. This concerns the "card warranty"'
and its legal and psychological impact upon the consumer's ability to
recover for damage caused by defective products. The term "card war-
ranty" refers to the printed "guarantee" or "warranty" (typically amount-
ing to a disclaimer of liability)' packaged with most manufactured
household articles and appliances sold on the consumer market.
The impact and importance of the card warranty is not confined to
its strictly "legal" consequences, but also involves the economic and
psychologcial objectives of the manufacturer. However, while the card
warranty serves these other purposes of the manufacturer, it is primarily
a warranty, purporting to extend protection to the buyer of the warranted
product.
Historically, an action for breach of warranty against the seller has
been the buyer's most effective remedy for injuries caused by defective
products.' Today, in many instances the buyer may more profitably
resort to the doctrine of strict liability.' In certain cases, a cause of action
for fraud may be the buyer's most effective medium of recovery.9
1. The articles and comments cited throughout this note are just a few of the
examples from recent years.
2. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). This landmark case held some particularly
restrictive examples of warranty disclaimers invalid as unconscionable and contrary to
public policy.
3. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110
N.W.2d 449 (1961); Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164
A.2d 773 (Super. Ct. 1960).
4. The words "consumer" and "buyer" will, in this note, be treated as synonymous
in referring to the purchaser of consumer goods, as distinguished from the commercial
or business buyer.
5. Since this type of warranty has nowhere been named or classified, the term
"card warranty" has been assigned -by the writer.
6. E.g., Rasmus v. A.D. Smith Corp., 158 F.Supp. 70 (W.D. Iowa 1958).
7. See generally Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM.
L. RE V. 699 (1936).
8. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
9. For example, privity of contract is not required in the fraud action; misre-
presentations of opinion are not usually construed to be warranties although they may
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Nevertheless there remain a great number of situations in which the
buyer must resort to warranty theory to obtain optimum relief. For
example, the doctrine of strict liability may not encompass all of the
elements of damage which are caused by a defective product;"O or the
buyer may wish to take advantage of the longer statute of limitations by
framing his complaint in warranty theory." Also, warranty theory may
often provide a more desirable remedy than fraud theory since warranty
recovery does not require that the buyer establish the seller's knowledge
of the defect. 2
This note attempts to classify the various major types of card
warranties. Suggestions are made as to the manufacturer's intent in
issuing the card warranty. Also, the legal and economic effect of the card
warranty's function as a disclaimer are explored.
I. THE CARD WARRANTY
Although the card warranty serves several purposes, it is primarily
a limited express warranty. A warranty is usually defined as:
A statement or representation made by the seller of goods
contemporaneously with and as a part of, the contract of sale,
although collateral to the express object of it, having reference
to the character, quality, or title of the goods, and by which
he promises or undertakes to insure that certain facts are, or
shall be, as he represents them.'
Warranties are either express (an actual representation made orally or
in writing, by the seller) or implied (arising by operation of law).
While warranty actions originally sounded in tort, the warranty is now
enforced in the form of an action on the contract of which it is a coll-
ateral part.' 4 Recovery premised upon a breach of warranty, then, does
not depend upon the subjective fault of the seller or manufacturer, but is
give rise to a cause of action under fraud theory. See generally 1 FRuMMER & FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCrs LIABILITY (1965).
10. Damages for economic loss and property damage to the product itself, as
distinguished from personal injuries and other property damage, are often not includable
under the strict tort theory. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d
145 (1965); See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960).
11. E.g., George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1964). § 2-725 of
the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as UCC] provides a four year statute
on causes of action for breach of contract, while the typical tort statute runs from only
one to two years. See Annot. 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965).
12. See 1 FRUMmER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.01(1) at 350.1-360
(1965).
13. 77 C.J.S. Sales §301 (1952), quoted with approval in Mitchell v. Rudasill, 332
S.W.2d 91, 94-95 (Mo. App. 1960).
14. See generally Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoLum.
L. Rav. 699 (1936).
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based upon his absolute liability for a breach of an express or implied
promise.15 Therefore, while a buyer suing for breach of warranty gen-
erally need not prove the seller's or manufacturer's negligence, he must
contend with the various problems of contract and sales law. 6
Card warranties, as a species of the express warranty, present
additional problems peculiar to themselves. The vast majority of, if not
all, card warranties are not only express warranties but are also attempted
disclaimers of warranty 7 and/or attempted limitations of liability for
damage caused by defective products. The card warranty operates as a
disclaimer by enumerating certain express obligations which the man-
ufacturer promises to undertake while disclaiming the implied warranties
which would otherwise arise upon purchase, 8 as well as expressly
limiting the extent of the manufacturer's liability for the consequences of
damage.
II. TYPES OF CARD WARRANTIES
While card warranties vary in organization and structure they
generally appear in one of two forms. Into the first category may be
grouped the type of card warranty requiring affirmative conduct on the
part of the buyer to effectuate its terms. The terms of the card direct the
buyer to sign and return the warranty by mail. Typically, the warranty
is printed on the back of a postage pre-paid card, addressed to the
manufacturer's offices.
This type of card warranty is commonly used by the manufacturer
as a vehicle through which to gather a wide variety of market and
distribution information. Often, for example, the cards are stamped with a
"registration" number corresponding to a number on the prdouct
packing carton which number also appears in the manufacturer's files. The
card advises the purchaser to "register" his purchase by mailing the card
to the manufacturer. When the manufacturer receives the card he is able,
by checking the registration number against his files, to obtain an overall
picture of the distribution pattern of his product, as well as to trace the
path of any particular item through the distributive channels. Usually,
15. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 237 (1948); UCC § 2-313, comment 1; Douglas v.
W. C. Mallison & Son, 265 N.C. 362, 144 S.E.2d 139 (1965).
16. The problems of privity, consideration for the warranty contract, disclaimers
and limitations of manufacturer's liability are discussed in parts II and III of this note.
See also Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) ; Comment,
The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protections. Recent Developments in the Law of
Sales Warranties, 64 MIcE. L. REv. 1430 (1966).
17. Many disclaimers are couched in the form of limited and exclusive express
warranties. Rasmus v. A. D. Smith Corp., 158 F.Supp. 70 (W.D. Iowa 1958).
18. The mere making of an express warranty, however detailed, does not negate
implied warranties except to the extent that it is inconsistent with them. Gottsdanker v,
Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal.App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
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the "mail-in" type of card warranty also contains fill-in or check-off blanks
requesting consumer and market information. This information aids the
manufacturer in designing, distributing and advertising his product to fit
the class of consumers who have most often purchased his product in the
past. The questions posed to the consumer may include requests for the
age and marital status of the buyer; the purpose (whether for home or
commercial use etc.) for which the product was purchased; the motivating
force which prompted the consumer's purchase (advertisement in a
magazine or on television, seeing the product on the store shelf etc.) and
many other market information questions."
The second major type of card warranty also is usually found in the
form of a printed card packaged with the manufacturer's product. This
second type, however, does not require any affirmative act on the part of
the consumer to effectuate its provisions. The buyer need not sign or mail
the warranty card." The card is merely a statement by the manufacturer,
often interspaced with advertising phrases and claims concerning the pro-
duct's effectiveness or beauty, of the manufacturer's "guarantee" or
"warranty" of the product. This second type may contain many or all of
the same warranty representations and disclaimers as the first type. This
warranty, as is the case with the "mail-in" type, usually extends to the
purchaser only a "repair or replacement" offer (usually at the manu-
facturer's option) if the product proves defective in the course of normal
use.
A number of important questions involving the use of card war-
anties are raised by the consumer's action in response to the card
warranty. Does the consumer gain or lose in terms of legal protection by
signing a card warranty? How may the consumer's conduct in signing or
not signing the card warranty effect the manufacturer's liability under the
implied warranties imposed by the Uniform Sales Act2 ' or the Uniform
Commercial Code?22 And finally, to what extent does the manner in
which the card warranty is, or is not, given effect by the courts reflect a
valid judgment as to the ability of the consumer to protect himself in a
modem era of mass consumer merchandising? But the basic question in
19. The informational requests vary widely according to the peculiarties of the
product to which the warranty is attached and the interests of the manufacturer. Those
listed in the text of the note are, however, common to most "mail-in" type card warranties.
20. The buyer is usually directed to save the warranty card and to present it along
with the product when he makes a claim for repair or replacement.
21. The Uniform Sales Act [hereinafter cited as USA] was drafted in 1906 and
was once the law in thirty jurisdictions. See E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, COM-
mERcIAL LAW 5 n.6 (1965). The USA has today been largely replaced by the UCC.
22. The UCC sections dealing with sales warranties are §§2-312 to -318 and
2-715, -718 and -719.
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relation to the card warranty is whether the warranty is legally binding
at all upon the parties to the sales transaction.
III. VALIDITY OF THE CARD WARRANTY
Since their legal validity and effectiveness may depend upon some-
what different factors, the two major types of card warranties--the
"mail-in" and the "non-mail-in" types-will be discussed separately.
However, statements relating to issues of the validity of disclaimer clauses
and limitations of liability may be understood as common to both types. 23
The "Mail-in" Card Warranty
The major obstacle to the validity and enforceability of the card war-
ranty is the problem of past consideration. A warranty, even if it is an in-
tegral part of the sale contract, is of itself a contract.24 Since the warranty
is an independent collateral contract25  it must be supported by
consideration.26 Usually the sales warranty is discussed and agreed upon
at the time the sale is transacted,27 is established by the custom and
usage of trade,2 or is implied by law.2 1 In these instances the considera-
tion problem is solved because the warranty contract is supported by the
price agreed to be paid for the goods comprising the subject matter of the
sale." However, when the warranty is given after the completion of the
sale, the consideration which usually supports the warranty has been
exhausted by the sale of the goods without the warranty. Hence, there is
no consideration to support this new element. 1 New consideration must
be found to support a warranty that is not a part of the original trans-
action.2
23. These are issues common to all warranties, assuming first that the warranty's
legal validity has been established.
24. While a warranty is a concomitant part of a contract of sale, it is also a
collateral, self-existing contract. M'Farland v. Newman, 9 Watts (Pa.) 55, 34 Am. Dec.
497 (1839) ; See generally 46 AM. JUR. Sales §299 (1943).
25. W & S Job v. Heidritter, 255 F.311 (2d Cir. 1918) (although the warranty
contract is said to be collateral to the sale contract). M'Farland v. Newman, 9 Watts
(Pa.) 55, 34 Am. Dec. 497 (1839).
26. W & S Job v. Heidritter, 255 F. 311 (2d Cir. 1918).
27. Express warranties, under the UCC are supposed to rest upon the "dickered"
aspects of each bargain. UCC §2-313, comment 1.
28. Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. (U.S.) 383 (1870); Boardman v. Spooner, 13
Allen (Mass.) 353, 90 Am. Dec. 196 (1865). The Uniform Sales Act provides that an
implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for a particular purpose may
be annexed by the usage of trade, USA §15 (5).
29. See, e.g., UCC §§2-314, -315.
30. Standard Cable Co. v. Denver Elect. Co., 76 F. 422 (3d Cir. 1896) ; See also I
S. WILLISTON SALES §211 (1948).
31. Id. See also Summers v. Vaughan, 35 Ind. 323, 9 Am. Rep. 741 (1871) ; White
v. Oakes, 88 Me. 367, 34 A. 175 (1896) ; See generally 46 Am. JUR. Sales §300 (1943).
32. Similarly, where a warranty offer has lapsed due to a buyer's failure to comply
with offered terms (such as signing and mailing in the case of the card warranty), such
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This method of presentation of the warranty-as an element apart
from the contract for the sale of the goods-raises two important
questions. First, is the card warranty actually issued after the con-
sumation of the sale transaction or is it, rather, an integral part of that
sale? Second, if the card warranty is, in fact, a latecomer to the sale
transaction, is there anything inherent in the card warranty situation
which may serve as the consideration necessary to support the warranty?
1. Card warranty as part of the sale contract
The card warranty is usually enclosed in the sealed product package.
Accordingly, the buyer may not notice an enclosed warranty card until
he opens the package after he has made the purchase. In fact, in the case
of gifts or products not purchased for immediate use, the warranty may
not come to the attention of the ultimate user for several weeks after
the purchase. In view of these factors it may appear that the card warranty
is a transaction distinct from the sale. However, a strong argument may
be advanced in favor of the opposite conclusion-especially in cases
arising under the Uniform Commercial Code.
Early case law required that a warranty, even though a collateral
contract,"3 form a part of the sale transaction. 4 The Uniform Sales Act
adopted this view" as well as the requirement that the warranty, in
order to be effective, must have constituted at least a portion of the
inducement for the sale."6 Accordingly, the USA defined a warranty as:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating
to the goods . . . if the natural tendency of such affirmation
or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and
the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon."
Under the USA, therefore, if the buyer had no knowledge of the warranty
at the time the sale was transacted, such warranty was of no legal effect
unless supported by new consideration. 8
The burden of establishing that a buyer had, in fact, relied upon the
seller's representations rested on the buyer. 9 In practice, however, the
warranty cannot be renewed without new consideration being given. Walters v. Akers,
31 Ky. L. Reptr. 259, 101 S.W. 1179 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907).
33. Gay Oil Co. v. Roach, 93 Ark. 454, 125 S.W. 122 (1910)
34. Crouch v. Parker, 188 Ind. 660, 125 N.E. 453 (1919) ; Hexter v. Bast, 125 Pa.
52, 17 A. 252 (1889).
35. USA §12.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Slide Mines v. Denver Equip. Co., 112 Colo. 285, 148 P.2d 1009 (1949) ; Kraig v.
Benjamin, 111 Conn. 297, 149 A. 687 (1930).
39. Mitchell v. Pinkneg, 127 Iowa 696, 104 N.W. 288 (1905) ; Shley v. Zalis, 172
Md. 336, 191 A. 563 (1937) ; see generally 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES §207 at 534-35 (1948).
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buyer was able to sustain his burden if he showed that the seller's
representations were such as would naturally induce a purchase, and that
the buyer did, in fact, purchase the goods concerning which the represen-
tations had been made.4
The UCC, in contrast to the USA, requires only that the warranty
statement be part of the "basis of the bargain" in order to be effective."
By not requiring the buyer to demonstrate reliance on the warranty
statement, the drafters of the Code may have intended to shift to the
seller the burden of showing that the affirmation or promise was not a
part of the sales agreement. 2 Thus, the "basis of the bargain" provision
of the UCC'2 which was probably intended to aid the buyer in establish-
ing his warranty" may, in the case of the card warranty, be of more aid
to the manufacturer or seller in establishing a disclaimer or limitation of
liability."2 In fact, the shift of the burden, charging the seller to show that
the warranty was not a part of the sale, may in effect, create a presumption
that the warranty-with its accompanying disclaimer-is a part of the
sales agreement.48 In addition, UCC §2-313, comment 7, states that:
The precise time when words of description or affirmation are
made . .. [is] not material. The sole question is whether the
language . . . [is] fairly to be regarded as a part of the contract.'
The comment further states that this warranty will become a "modifica-
tion" and does not require further consideration "if it is otherwise
reasonable.""'
40. See 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 207 at 534 (1948).
41. "Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the 'basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise." UCC §2-313(1)
(a).
42. [N]o particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order
to weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take
such affirmations once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative
proof.
UCC §2-313, comment 3.
43. UCC §2-313(1) (a).
44. See UCC §2-313, comment 3.
45. See examples in Appendix.
46. But see Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 224 S.C. 105, 77 S.E.2d 583 (1955),
where the court held that the disclaimer portion of a card warranty would have to be
brought to the attention of the buyer at the time the sale is made in order to be effective.
47. UCC §2-313, comment 7.
48. Id. This provision is to be read in connection with UCC §2-209. Comment 1 to
that section states:
This section seeks to protect and make effective all necessary and desireable
modifications of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which at
present hamper such adjustments.
But this concept still must be squared with the requirement that the warranty be made
as part of the "basis of the bargain." See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
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However, even if this argument tends to establish an effective warr-
anty, it may be ineffective in establishing the validity of the disclaimer
contained in the card warranty. The Code requires that disclaimers of
the warranty of merchantability-the buyer's primary source of protec-
tion-must be conspicuous and mention merchantability." This language
could be interpreted to mean that the disclaimer must be conspicuous at
the time of the sale."' If this interpretation is valid, the warranty
language may be enforceable while the disclaimer portions of the card
warranty may be ineffectual.
Arguably, a card warranty may be part of the "basis of the bargain"
even if it is not referred to or seen by the buyer prior to the completion of
the sale. Since most home appliance sales today involve a card warranty,
the consumer may reasonably be presumed to expect a card warranty to be
included within the package containing his merchandise. 1 Therefore, it
may well be that the card warranty, by force of custom and usage, has be-
come a part of the contract of sale-part of what the consumer is buying
-when the purchase involves a product normally the subject of a card
warranty. 2
Warranty cards themselves often contain advertising phrases along
with their warranty provisions." In addition, the retailer of the product
may display the card warranty attached to the product as it stands on the
shelves-the word "guarantee" or "warranty" conspicuous in bold type
across the card. 4 In such situations the other side of the consideration
argument may be present. Since this advertising is presumably aimed at
effecting the sale of the product, this warranty may be shown to have
been a part of what the consumer "bought" and, hence, a part of the
"basis of the bargain" under the UCC. If the card warranty is part of the
basis of the original bargain, the fact that the buyer may later be required
to perform some affirmative act in order to effectuate the warranty (sign
and mail the warranty card to the manufacturer) should have no bearing
on the warranty's validity.55
49. UCC §2-316(2).
50. See Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 224 S.C. 105, 77 S.E.2d 583 (1955).
51. When a consumer purchases a closed container or package, he has purchased
everything which might reasonably be expected to be inside. See Cooper v. Common-
wealth, 110 Ky. 123, 60 S.W. 938 (1901). See generally R. BROWN, THE LAW OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY, §10 at 22 (2d ed. 1955).
52. See generally 46 AM. JUR. Sales §304 (1943). The "precise time when words of
description or affirmations are made or samples shown is not material." UCC §2-313,
comment 7.
53. See examples in Appendix.
54. Id.
55. Robinson v. Berkey, 100 Iowa 136, 69 N.W. 434 (1896) ; Russell v. Murdock,
79 Iowa 101, 44 N.W. 237 (1890).
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2. Consideration for the card warranty
Even assuming that the card warranty is tzot part of the "basis of
the bargain," there remains the possibility that some consideration may be
found to validate the warranty as a separate contract. The usual card
warranty is, as previously stated, a disclaimer and an attempted limitation
of liability, as well as a limited express warranty." In assenting to the
disclaimer, the buyer may be said to be giving up something at the time
of purchase-his right to the warranties which would otherwise be
implied by law. In exchange for the surrender of these warranties, the
buyer receives, by virtue of the express warranty contained on the card,
privity of contract with the manufacturer. Although this exchange is
easier to justify in jurisdictions which do not recognize the strict
liability theory and in which the privity requirement remains as a bar, the
consideration should be effective even in those jurisdictions which have
done away with the privity requirement. In these jurisdictions the buyer
will still receive something he would not otherwise have-the ability to
sue in warranty. The privity requirement is usually not bypassed in
assumpsit actions." Therefore, the card warranty provides the buyer
with a better opportunity to select his best avenue of recovery."8 In
certain situations, the buyer's ability to adopt a warranty theory rather
than a tort theory may prove to be a valuable asset. This can best be
illustrated by examination of the situation in California, often considered
the leading exponent of the strict tort theory. There, the lifting of the
privity requirement is limited to actions for harm to persons or property
and is not available where recovery is sought for some type of purely
economic loss." Thus, if the buyer's loss involves the price of the product,
loss of earnings, loss of profits or other damage to business property
caused by the defective product, the buyer must resort to his remedy in
warranty or some cause of action other than tort. Since the card warranty
buyer has been vested with privity by virtue of the card warranty contract,
he is free to pursue his best remedy.
However, the drawback inherent in this use of the card warranty by
the purchaser is the fact that the card warranty is also a disclaimer. The
buyer may be placed into the awkward position of pleading the card
warranty in order to establish privity, and then of attempting to avoid
the warranty's restrictive terms in order to escape the limitations placed on
the manufacturer's liability. This dilemma is, however, obviated to the
56. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
57. See Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966). See generally
Prosser, The Assaut Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960).
58. See note 10 supra and accompanying text for the relative advantages of the
warranty action as against tort or fraud theory in particular cases.
59. Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
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extent that the warranty's disclaiming terms may be held "unconscion-
able""0 or otherwise invalidated.
The "Non-Mail-in" Card Warranty
The "non-mail-in" warranty raises several problems in addition to
those presented by the "mail-in" type. When the consumer discovers a
warranty of this type within the product package, it is less likely that the
warranty can truly be said to be part of the "basis of the bargain." UCC
§2-209(1) provides that even after a contract has been entered into, it
may be modified by agreement of the parties, even though no additional
consideration passes between them. However, this is probably not to
suggest that a warranty may arise in this manner. Section 2-209(1)
must be reconciled with the requirement that warranties be part of the
"basis of the bargain."'" Since the "non-mail-in" card warranty is not
usually called to the attention of the prospective buyer, and often is
enclosed inside a sealed package making thorough inspection an impos-
sibility, it is difficult to contend that this warranty is a part of the basic
sale contract. 2 There remains, however, the argument that this type of
warranty has, by custom and usage, become a part of the contract of
sale.6"
Even if the "non-mail-in" card warranty is not a part of the "basis of
the bargain," its warranty provisions may have some legal significance
in view of the advertising representations such card warranties often
contain. 4 Although this warranty may not be discovered until after the
sale is made, if the buyer relies on the advertising representations contain-
ed in the warranty material and is caused injury because the representa-
tions are untrue, the buyer may have a cause of action in the tort theory
of misrepresentation." This is precisely what occurred in the case of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Incorporated.6 In the Greennan
case the untrue representation was contained in a brochure packaged with
the product purchased, rather than in the card warranty itself.67 The
60. See part VI infra for discussion of the card warranty's effectiveness as a
disclaimer.
61. UCC §2-313(1) (a).
62. The buyer is not, of course, deprived of his ability to rely on the warranty
because of failure to inspect if the defects are such that they would not be revealed by
inspection. McCabe v. L.K. Ligget Drug Co., 330 Mass. 177, 112 N.E.2d 254 (1953)
(a case involving a defective coffeemaker).
63. See note 53 supra and accompanying text for the analogous argument in
relation to the "mail-in" type card warranty.
64. See examples in Appendix.
65. See W. PROSsER, TORTS 729 (3d ed. 1963).
66. 59 Cal. App. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
67. It is suggested that in legal effect and, to a large extent, as to manufacurer's
intention in issuance, such brochures and the "non-mail-in" type of card warranty are
very similar. In fact many card warranties are presented as part of a brochure giving
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court allowed recovery from the manufacturer based upon the buyer's
reliance on the brochure's assurances that the power tool that he had
purchased was "rugged." The buyer was injured when inadequately fast-
ened set-screws in the tool vibrated loose during the normal use of the
power tool."8
As illustrated by the Greenman case, consumers have had some
success in asserting the card warranty. However, manufacturers, as we
shall see, have not been as successful in asserting the disclaimer pro-
visions of the card warranty in similar cases."9
IV. MANUFACTURER'S PURPOSES
While the card warranty is a warranty and disclaimer on its face,
it is used for a great deal more. The use of the card warranty as an
information gathering medium has already been discussed"0 and other
possible uses have been alluded to in the text. Because of their importance
-these purposes may be the main objective of the issuance of the card
warranty-they deserve a more detailed discussion.
The Card Warranty as Advertisement
The disclaimer provisions and other material contained in the card
warranty are directed at several objectives and it is important to view the
card warranty with this in mind. One of the functions which the card
warranty performs is that of advertising the product to which the
warranty is attached.71 The warranty card and the booklet or brochure
to which it may be attached," usually are intended to inspire the con-
fidence of the potential buyer.7"
A card warranty may seem, to the average consumer, a readily
visible indication that the manufacturer will "stand behind" his product.
However, the "guarantee" that the consumer notices attached to the
product is probably an attempt to divest him of some protection.
Because consumers are, for the most part, unaware that a seller
would be under warranty obligations notwithstanding his vol-
operating instructions and advertising the product purchased as well as the other prod-
ucts manufactured by the company.
68. See also 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §402A (1965).
69. See Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 244 S.C. 105, 77 S.E.2d 583 (1955).
70. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
71. See examples in Appendix.
72. Card warranties are often found as a detachable part of brochures and in-
struction booklets packaged with the various products.
73. This factor may be important in establishing the "reliance" necessary to the
effectuation of a valid warranty. See UCC §2-313, comment 3.
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untary guarantees, they are reassured and comforted by a pro-
vision which may in fact strip them of protection."'
Since the average buyer of consumer goods"M is generally without the
legal knowledge or assistance necessary to appreciate the import and
effect of the wording of the card warranty, he may not be aware of what
he really receives or more importantly, what he gives up-when he
signs and returns a card warranty to the manufacturer.
The Card Warranty as a Disclaimer
The actual disclaimer portions of the warranty card, as distinguished
from the advertising and the warranty language, function on two levels-
as a psychological deterrent and as a "legal" disclaimer.
1. The card warranty as a psychological disclaimer
The disclaiming language of the card warranty may act as a dis-
couragement to spurious claims which might be brought by consumers
searching for the "deep pocket."7 6 For this reason many card warranties
contain rather restrictive time limitations, as well as extreme limitations
on the extent of the manufacturer's liability. The card may state, for
example, that the warranty period shall last for only ninety days or
perhaps six month.s. 7 The fact that this limitation may conflict with
the UCC or with another statutory standard is not important. In many
situations the manufacturer may never intend to plead the time period
should litigation actually arise, it being sufficient that some potential
claims are averted by the fact that the buyer believes that his warranty
has "run out."
With the same preventive objective the card warranty may also
impose other conditions such as requiring that the consumer bring or
mail the product or defective part to the manufacturer's designated
service office and that the consumer pay for any mailing or labor costs.
Under this type of provision, the manufacturer assumes responsibility
only for the replacement value of the needed parts.7
Many of these provisions entail such expenditures of time and
trouble that the consumer may not attempt to enforce a minor claim. This
is part of the economic "loss" to consumers that is rarely accounted for or
74. Comment, Disclaimers of Watvanty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. REv. 319,
329 (1964).
75. The UCC defines "consumer goods" as goods used or bought primarily for
personal, family or household purposes. UCC §9-109(1).
76. 1 A. CORBIn, CONTRACTS §128 (Supp. 1961).
77. Some card warranties state that they take effect at the date of signing and
mailing by the buyer. Others take effect at the "date of purchase," and therefore are
usually required to be stamped or signed by the retail dealer.
78. See examples in Appendix.
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recovered, and which gives rise to the outcry for governmental supervision
of consumer marketing practices."9 Tremendous sums are ultimately in-
volved in these and other consumer sales practices,"0 even though
individual losses may be relatively small. When, for example, the con-
sumer looks to his warranty upon discovering that his newly purchased
product is no longer functioning properly, he may see that his ninety
day warranty has run its course, even though he has actually used the
product for a relatively few hours. In any event, the consumer will note
that the warranty is limited to "repair and replacement" of certain parts,
often with the requirement that the product be repaired only by certain
qualified persons at designated service centers."1 Lacking both the time
and the proclivity to mount an argument with either the store where the
product was purchased or the service center where he is to have it re-
paired, the average consumer may be more likely to put the entire
problem out of his mind rather than to go to the expense and time of
seeking a legal remedy.
Herein lies at least one of the important uses of the card warranty. It
functions as what might be termed an economic or quasi-legal disclaimer
or limitation of liability. This may prevent the assertion of thousands of
petty (and perhaps some fairly substantial) claims against the manufac-
turer which claims might, in the aggregate, cause him immense
expenditures of labor, time and money if he were to undertake to correct
them all.
2. The card warranty as a legal disclaimer
The second level on which the disclaimer portion of the card warranty
functions, is as a protection against major liability claims by injured
buyers.
Ordinarily, for simple business reasons, a manufacturer has no
objection to repairing or replacing those of his products which are
defective. This is merely good business practice in that it creates good will
toward the manufacturer and his product. Furthermore, since the size of
such loss is, after a period of production and sale of the product, statistic-
ally predictable, these losses can be taken into account in the price of the
product and be passed on to the consumer.8" Hence, most card warranties
commit the manufacturer to "repair and replacement" of parts.8 3
79. See Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MICH. L. Rav. 1203 (1966).
80. Consumer expenditures today account for almost two-thirds of the $700 billion
in goods and services produced annually. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, 209
(table c-14) (Jan. 1967).
81. See examples in Appendix.
82. Keeton, Products Liability--Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64
MICH. L. REv. 1329 (1966).
83. See examples in Appendix.
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The costs which result from successful suits for consequential
damages against the manufacturer are not so easily taken into account.
The amounts of such recovery may vary widely and are statistically
unpredictable.8" Accordingly, it may be impossible to include these
losses in the price. It is also more difficult to pass these costs to the
consumer in a competitive market.8 5 For these reasons, the card warranty
is generally limited to "repair and replacement" liability, and responsi-
bility for consequential damages is disclaimed.
V. LIMITATIONS ON THE CARD WARRANTY DISCLAIMER
While the courts have recognized that it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for the modern consumer to make intelligent judgments
about the safety or suitability of products in his day-to-day purchases
(hence the doctrine of strict liability in tort)," the consumer is generally
assumed competent to make an intelligent judgment as to whether or
not he should accept the product subject to the terms demanded. 7
Several recent decisions have checked the more flagrant abuses of war-
ranty disclaimers and limitations of liability.8 However, it is still
probably true that consumers "lose" as much or more through deceptive
advertising and lack of information concerning what it is (including a
warranty disclaimer) that they are buying, than they do as a result of
physical harm caused by these products.8 "
The UCC does not alleviate the consumer's burden in this respect.
The issuer of a card warranty is free to limit his liability for a great
portion of the risk inherent in placing his product on the market. The
warranty provisions of the Code are not designed to meet the problem of
inequality of bargaining position regarding consumer purchases."0
84. The recovery may, for example, include such elements as damages to third
persons who might forseeably be injured by defects. See UCC §2-318. See also United
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Blalcrank, Inc., 175 Ohio St. 267, 193 N.E.2d 920 (1963).
85. The drop in sales, caused by raising prices to cover litigation losses, could
force some marginal producers out of business. In any event, a rise in prices to cover
such losses would be in effect, forcing some buyers to subsidize the injuries to others.
86. See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099(1960).
87. See generally Comment, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77
HARv. L. REv. 318 (1964).
88. Along with the celebrated Henningson case, discussed in note 2 supra, decisions
such as State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110
N.W.2d 449 (1961) which held that the giving of an express warranty did not negative
an auto dealer's implied warranty of fitness for use; and Pabon v. Hackensack Auto
Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (Super. Ct. 1960), which extended the
implied warranty of fitness for use to all persons who, in the reasonable contemplation
of the parties to the warranty, might be expected to become a user; have continued the
trend.
89. Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 1203, 1209 (1966).
90. "The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and
not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." UCC
§2-302, comment 1.
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Neither is it the purpose of the unconscionability clause to disturb alloc-
able risk because of superior bargaining power. 1
Although an express warranty is, ideally, the result of "dickering"
between the buyer and the seller, 2 in most instances the consumer has no
meaningful choice. However, while automobiles 3 and food9 have been
found to be essential to the maintenance of an "acceptable" standard of
living, hence justifying judical actions overriding the restrictive provisions
of disclaimers by sellers of these products, few other consumer goods are
likely to meet this standard. Therefore, many products which are virtual
necessities to a modern way of life are presumably sold on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. The result is that the absence of a true alternative may not
render an otherwise valid card warranty limitation of liability unenforce-
able.95
Other factors have been suggested as providing a check on the power
of the manufacturer. Some have argued that industry is subject to a
pervasive "public consensus" which compels consideration of the con-
sumer's interest in order to avoid governmental intervention or the
emergence of new common law rules9 But this type of aid is slow in
coming if it comes at all. Indeed, card warranties have found their most
effective use in court as disclaimers and limitations of liability,97 and the
card warranty is probably more popular with manufacturers today than
ever.
It has been suggested that the UCC requirements that all dis-
claimers be conspicuous98 and more specific than under prior law, might
embarrass manufacturers and dissuade them from exerting the full weight
of their economic and legal power.99 Yet, the card warranty, while
generally complying with the directives of the UCC, has provided a
method of avoiding embarrassment while retaining the ability to exert
pressure. When a consumer signs a disclaimer and assumes the risk of
loss, the cost of such risk no longer serves as an incentive to improvement
of product quality or safety, °° except to the limited extent allowed by
91. UCC §2-302, comment 1.
92. "Express warranties rest on 'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain ..
UCC §2-313.
93. See Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
94. Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110
(N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1939).
95 But see Comment, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 420 (1961).
96. See Berle, Power Without Property, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1198 (1966).
97. See generally Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 583 (1955) ; Hydrotex Industries v. Floyd, 209 Ark. 781, 192 S.W.2d 759 (1946).
98. See UCC §2-316.
99. See Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1960).
100. See Comment, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARv. L. REV.
318, 325. (1964)
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the limits of the card warranty and the overriding provisions of the UCC.
And, because these disclaimers are couched in the form of limited express
warranties'.' they do not warn the consumer about the type of defect or
harm that the product may cause. The card warranties appear to the
consumer, rather, as much like advertisements and continuing propoganda
for the manufacturer's product as they appear to be the warranties which
they nominally are. The language on the warranty card will often con-
gratulate the consumer on having purchased "a fine quality product" and
will promise that, with proper care, the product will deliver "years of
trouble free service." This language has the effect of obscuring the dis-
claimer provisions of the warranty.
Additional checks on the manufacturer's use of the card warranty as
a limitation of liability arise if the conflict results in actual litigation.0 2
The usual card warranty contains a far more extensive disclaimer of
warranty than the manufacturer could ever reasonably expect to be able
to enforce in court. For example, many card warranties contain clauses
which purport to absolve the manufacturer from liability for all con-
sequential damages. However, disclaimer clauses which attempt to limit
consequential damages, at least so far as injury to the person is concerned,
are made prima facie unconscionable by the Code,"°3 and an implied
warranty is extended to buyer's family and houseguests who may fore-
seeably use, consume, or be affected by the consumer goods.' In
addition, the buyer has an action against the seller for breach of warranty
where the buyer has been compelled to pay damages to a third person for
injuries caused by the defective condition of an article manufactured or
supplied by a seller.'
VI. VALIDITY OF THE CARD WARRANTY DISCLAIMER
Prior to the advent of the UCC, disclaimers and limitations of
liability for breach of warranty were usually written as an integral part
of the warranty.' A clause which gave a limited express warranty and
stated it to be in lieu of all other warranties, express or implied, was
101. See Rasmus v. A.O. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Iowa 1958).
102. For example, the burden of proving the existence and enforceable elements of
a warranty is on the party relying upon it. Intrastate Credit Service, Inc. v. Pervo
Paint Co., 1 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1965). The court may also require that a disclaimer must
be brought to the attention of the buyer at the time of the sale. Joseph v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 224 S.C. 105, 77 S.E.2d 583 (1955).
103. UCC §2-719(3).
104. UCC §2-318. The section also states that a seller may not exclude or limit
the operation of this provision.
105. United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Blalcrank, Inc., 195 Ohio St. 267, 193 N.E.2d 92
(1963).
106. Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, Inc., 724 S.E.2d 622 (W.Va. 1962).
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generally held to be an effective disclaimer.' While the UCC provides
that any clause disclaiming warranty liability or modifying warranty
terms must be conspicuous,"'8 there is no corresponding requirement
concerning provisions which purport to regulate the extent of the seller's
liability."0 9 While the ommission may, in some cases, be remedied by
resort to UCC § 2-302, which authorizes the court to void any "uncon-
scionable" provision,"' even this provision may be inadequate to fully
protect the consumer. For example, comment one"' to UCC §2-719
states that in every sales contract there must be at least a "fair quantum"
of remedy for breach and that too great a restriction on remedy is subject
to deletion as unconscionable. However, the section itself suggests the
validity of a limitation to "repair and repayment of the price.""'
As previously noted, the seller or manufacturer is usually more than
willing to make such adjustments."1 8 Accordingly, this provision may
leave the manufacturer free to effectively limit his liability to those
elements of risk that he would in any event desire to assume.' If the
consumer's damage is primarily economic, this limitation may close off
his only effective remedy, since even the doctrine of strict liability in tort
while often available in cases of harm to the person," 5 generally does
not extend to cases in which the loss is economic." 6 The UCC provides
that "limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable,""' 7 it is silent on
the question of the consumer's large property losses except for the negative
107. Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953); Lambrazo v.
Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931).
108. See UCC §2-316.
109. These provisions are U.C.C. §§2-718, allowing liquidation of damages subject
to certain restrictions, and 2-719, whereby parties to a sale may agree upon warranty
remedies in addition to or in place of those specifically provided by the Code.
110. Cf. UCC §2-719.
111. The comments to the Code do not have the weight of the Code provisions
themselves, but they do have the weight of legislative history since state legislatures
which have enacted the Code should be presumed to have been aware of them when they
acted. See E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, COMMERCIAL LAW 7-10 (1965).
112. The agreement may . . . limit or alter the measure of damages
recoverable .... as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-performing goods
or parts....
UCC §2-719(1) (a).
113. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
114. But this provision is subject to UCC §2-719, which states that there must be,
in every contract, at least a fair quantum of remedy or else the contract will be voided
as unconscionable.
115. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960).
116. Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
117. UCC § 2-719(3).
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inference to be drawn from UCC § 2-719 (3).118
There have, however, been several notable exceptions to the inter-
pretation of the strict liability doctrine which would exclude economic
damage as a measure of recovery. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in the
case of Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,"' allowed the ultimate pur-
chaser of loomed carpeting to maintain an action for breach of the implied
warranty of fitness for use. The action was maintained even in the
absence of privity of contract and even though damages were limited to
the loss of the value of the carpeting."' The court allowed the buyer
to maintain the action because of "considerations of justice" and stated
that the defective product need not necessarily be dangerous to life and
limb or to the interests of society as a whole21 in order that one who
suffers a loss be allowed to recover.' The New Jersey court, refused to
draw a distinction between property damage and damage to the person." 8
The court stated that where a manufacturer puts a worthless article in the
hands of a consumer, the manufacturer should be responsible for the loss
he causes to the purchaser."' The decision also points up a little-discussed
portion of the now famous Henningson.. case in which the buyer was
also allowed to recover the value of the automobile which, because of its
defective condition, had caused injury to his wife. 2
While consumers have sometimes been successful in asserting the
card warranty's protection, manufacturers generally have been unable to
invoke the protection of the disclaimer provisions. The situation presented
in Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Company2 was similar to the facts of the
Greenman case in which the buyer recovered. However, in Joseph the
seller was the party relying upon the warranty. The consumer had
purchased a pressure cooker from seller's store. When the cooker exploded
and injured the buyer during normal use, recovery was sought by the
buyer. The seller asserted that a printed "guarantee," contained in the
instructions book which came packaged with the cooker, limited his
118. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is
commercial is not. UCC §2-719(3).
119. 44 N.J.52, 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1964).
120. See also Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
121. These were some of the factors which were considered as reasons militating in
favor of allowance of an action of this type in the court's earlier decision in Henningson
v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
122. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d at 305.
123. Id. at 308.
124. Id. at 309. See also Randy Knitwear, Inc. v.American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d
5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962).
125. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
126. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 308 (1965).
127. Greeman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.App. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897(1963).
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liability to replacement of the cooker. Even though the consumer admitted
that she had read the instruction book carefully, the court refused to give
effect to the "guarantee" as a disclaimer.12 The court held that the
"guarantee" would have to be called to the attention of the buyer at the
time of purchase in order for it to operate as a effective disclaimer.'
The question remains as to the impact of the rationale of the Joseph
case upon a "mail-in" card warranty in the same situation. As noted
previously, the "mail-in" card warranty is more likely to be held enforce-
able. '3 However, even if the warranty is given effect the question would
remain as to the effect the disclaimer provision of the warranty would
have.
CONCLUSION
The card warranty functions on a variety of levels and may often be
used by the consumer to his advantage. But the card warranty still
remains as a potential source of danger to the uninformed consumer. It
must be understood that the card warranty is not attached to the product
by the manufacturer in order to "give" anything to the consumer other
than a limited assurance concerning repair of the product should it break
down. The cards function as advertisements for the products and, on
several levels, as disclaimers and limitations of liability. Only secondarily
does the card warranty function as a protective device for the modern
purchaser of consumer goods.
128. Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 224 S.C. 105, 77 S.E.2d 583 (1955). The case
is discussed in section II supra.
129. Id.
130. See text accompanying notes 24-55 supra.
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APPENDIX I
An example of the "non-mail-in" type of card warranty. The examples in
Appendix II on next page are a "mail-in" card warranty and certificate.
GUARANTEE
Every product is thoroughly tested and inspected before it leaves our
factory. Should it fail to give satisfactory service, return *be completeI product to our nearest Factory Service Center,. or to a Authorized
Service Station, with transportation charges prepaid. We gudiftee to replace-
free of charge any part or parts found by us to be defective due to fauty
material or workmanship, provided repairs have not been made or attempted )
by others. This guarantee does not cover damage caused by misuse, negligent
handling, or normal "wear and tear." No other guarantee, written or verbal,
on our products is authorized by us.
This guarantee is backed by numerous" Factory Service Centers
and Authorized Service Stations throughout the country. See the
complete listing on the back cover.
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APPENDIX II
REIRN THIS CARD TO FACTORY
-<--AVGOJ. QMV-a SIM IIVW
NARRAN TV Y UUVVVUUVUOO
BJWUUUMMAIWIWM WM W)U M IVWU I 6IA\'S-
All instruments identified as models are guaranteed against defects
in materiats nd workmanship of parts in the radio and/or amplifier chassis, for five years and
all other tubes and parts for one year and the diamond stylus against excessive wear for ten
years from the date of sale to the original purchaser. Repair service required during the first
three months after date of sale and initial installation service of console models, ,will be
furnished without charge.
The Company has agreed through its dealers for the replacement, as herein set forth, of tubes
and parts which prove to be defective within the applicable warranty period, provided that such
defect is brought to the attention of the dealer from whom the instrument was purchased. A worn stylus
will be replaced when presented to the dealer together with the Diamond Stylus Certificate,
provided that his examination discloses a degree of wear that would cause distortion and/or excessive record wear.
If stylus is to be replaced in the instrument itself, a reasonable labor charge will be made far such added service.
Portable and table television models to be repaired under the three months labor warranty, must he delivered to the
dealer's service department or a Warranty Service Center and picked up after the repairs are completed.
Replacement ports are guaranteed only for the remainder of the original applicable warranty period.
instruments are sold only through carefully selected dealers of recognized integrity and the company's
guarantee applies only to instruments which have been purchased from authorized dealers in the United States and
is limited tonormol usage of the instrument in the United States. Overseas customers will be advised by the seller,
a the time of product sale, of any applicable warranty provisions. Similarly, this guarantee does not apply if the
instrument serial number has been altered, effaced or removed.
The worranty registration card supplied with each instrument must be completed by the original purchaser and
mailed to The Company, within 10 days after installation to make this warranty effective.
This warranty may be modified by notice from the Company to its dealers, but no modification will effect instru-
ments previously sold by its dealers. 1B 2529-1
L
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